That's why it's so important to do a complete and thorough preflight, especially after any service. Thankfully I've never found any problem other than compass deviation. From time to time I've mentioned that people should do predrive with automobiles as well. At the very least, check all your tires every time you get in the car, and stomp on the brakes to see if they work.
This is indeed "frightening." Maybe Design News should be highlighting this kind of scary story as we approach Halloween.
What stands out to me is how the crew's attitude changed when Len hit the "gear up" switch. He was right from the beginning, but no one took his concerns seriously until he had a physical demonstration. Then he quickly won everyone to his side.
This should be a lesson to all engineers that "show" is better than "tell."
The spirit (or should I say ghost) of Richard Feynmann lives on.
I'm really, really surprised that the sliver wasn't accounted for during the modification. Aircraft maintenance and fabrication is normally much more focused on accounting for everything that goes in and out of an aircraft. Lost fasteners must be found and so forth.
I always preflight my plane, truck and motorcycle. On the C-130 in the article a preflight probably would not have found the problem. The elevator isn't visible from the cockpit, so "Flight Controls Free and Correct" would not help. The first sign of trouble would have been at gear retraction as the author pointed out.
I do wonder a bit on the veracity....the flight controls in a C-130 "Herky Bird" are mechanical...pushrods, bellcranks, cables, and pulleys. AFAIK even the latest "J" version is not fly-by-wire.
The problem described would have been in the autopilot system, not the primary flight controls. As kenish correctly notes, C-130's have hydraulically-booseted manual controls, not fly-by-wire. The Functionl Check Flight crew would not have the autopilot engaged during takeoff, but could have had an unexpected surprise when they engaged the autopilot in flight. However, they could have quickly disengaged the autopilot, and most autopilots have clutches that will allow the crew to overpower the autopilot inputs with the cockpit controls.
TJ, the metallic sliver was likely introduced by drilling of the structure near the harness, which introduced shavings into the harness that were not properly cleaned up. Have seen this several times. You would be shocked at the lack of QA at some of the military overhaul depots. One major depot that one of my aircraft went through had no independant inspection. They relied on the technician performing the work to inspect his own work (all in the interest of cost savings).
Wow, the lack of good QA at the depot level is extremely scary. I worked 12 years in the general/commercial avionics world, and EVERYTHING had to be checked by an in-house FAA approved inspector. Techs certifying their own work is a recipe for disaster.
Good points - I agree it is always more convincing to show than tell. We as engineers are often too busy to spend the time to figure out how to show - it's not always easy. But definitely worth it - especially when it comes to mission critical issues.
My wife relayed a story one of the tubing bender operators told her about a young "hot-shot" engineer that had designed a tube that he was convinced saved money, material, and maintenance cost by eliminating a few fittings. He had spent days checking that the tube could be installed in one piece as opposed to being made in 3 pieces and assembled on the aircraft. The tubing bender operator rejected the part several times, only to have it resubmitted without any changes. This resulted in a "face to face" requested by the tubing bender operator. He took the engineer, who was still adamantly defending the viability of the part, down to the bending machine and proceeded to "bend" the newly engineered part. The tubing bender started whipping the tubing around wildly to make the multitude of small bends necessary resulting in large chuncks of tubing kinking, snapping off and flying around the shop....... Obviously the engineer agreed to re-work the part......this time with fittings.
The longer I am in engineering, the longer I realize intuition is as important as math and numbers. Learning to listen to your intuition is as important as learning theories. There are so many interactions in a system, is impossible for anyone to systematically troubleshoot. Sometime when you are faced with a problem, is best to stand back and ask yourself what do you think. What does your little voice tell you.
Good point about asking dumb questions, MBlazer. For that to happen, a certain attitude is needed at the top -- one that welcomes all kinds of questions, not just those that sound intelligent but may, in fact, be worthless.
After reading the story I don't believe that Lockheed designed a single point failure mode of the primary flight control system. All aircraft are designed with redundancy based on risk. Flight control failure though low in risk is high in severity and thus qualifies for redundancy.
This story reminds me of a physics professor that refused to give partial credit on complex problems. His reasoning was that in real life even tiny mistakes like an errant punch slug can have disastrous consequences. We as engineering students had to learn that there is no almost wrong or almost right.
The story doesn't say how many years of experience the mechanic had. After spending several years working on stone machines I could diagnose many problems by a slight difference in the noise the machine made. A new operator couldn't distinguish the difference. So the twitch that was of no concern to a less experienced mechanic, obviously caught the attention of the more experienced mechanic.
I have been in manufacturing since 1964 and I love to hear a younger voice admit that there are occasions when experience counts for something. As another poster on this thread has said, sometimes things just did not sound right. It is amazing to me how much seat-of-the-pants knowledge is rejected by people new to the field because it does not appear in a textbook nor is there an algorithm written to which it can be tested.
It goes without saying that a dinosaur like me also needs to be receptive to innovation. It is called teamwork.
Experience does count. When I had my automotive electrical shop, I could "diagnose" a number of problems just from the customer's description... Certain GM automobiles would have the radio shut off when the driver's door was opened. This was a blown Cigarette lighter fuse, most likely caused by coins in the ashtray,,,, Certain Fords would trigger the intermittent wipers whenever the headlights were turned on, or the high beams activated. This was a loose Driver side wiring harness body ground. Imagine tracking those down the first time!
"Intuition" is not just wild hunches popping out of the air! Most often it is built on both experience and understanding of a system, or systems. A complete ubderstanding does not need to come from experience, and experience alone does not bring understanding. But some few people develope both, and hence become quite valuable.
What I wonde is just what kind of test would have spotted that problem, and how often are tests like that done? A short circuit between circuits on a harness plug is not something that one person would check for with a multimeter alone. Finding the problem by dignostics would have meant looking at the circuits and finding what wires could have a problem that would cause the symptom, , and then tracing that circuit to find the problem. Not a simple task by any means.
Before retiring in the Pengagon I had a USN Captain boss who firmly believed in the JDLR theory: just does'nt look right. When planes were prepared to be "shot off the pointy end of the boat", there is a collection of maintenance people who are looking at the plane on the catapult and all are giving a "thumbs up" before the catapult officer "fires" the cat and launches the plane. Any one of those "checkers" who may be very junior airmen, though highly trained, are given the authority to halt the launch if he / she sees something irregular. It is a big deal to take a plane off the cat, as it has to be taken backwards to a position where the problem can be evaluated / resolved. Making the call must be supported by the maintenance officers, as the consequence of a fault on launch can be catastrophic in terms of both costly material and lives. Very often the "JDLR" is hard to define exactly, but when it is finally figured out, it may have been something very subtle and almost impossible to explain why it triggered a concern on the part of the guy who suspended the event. Also, the system has to tolerate the occassional wrong guess: when there really is nothing wrong: the technician still has to be ready to do the same thing again the next time he sees something that JDLR. Lots of the comments above bring familiar memories to mind from my 26 years of AC maintenance in the USN, USAF and aircraft manufacturer environment. None are unbelievable to me. Thanks for the memories.
I appreciate the interest that this article has drawn. I am sorry to say that I no longer have access to the individual that related the story to me, so some questions will remain unanswered.
What happens with refurbishment of complicated systems in an airplane can never be simulated, because there are too many "degrees of freedom" to explore. You would have to be able to simulate Murphy's Law for each individual who had a hand in the work.
What I CAN say, after having assembled wiring harnesses like these over a few Summers during college, is that a Service Bulletin may have required a slightly larger whole to be punched (could be 1/16th inch larger) to accommodate a few more signal paths in the harness. This would be punched out of the bulkhead panel and then, the new harness could be installed.
Airmen usually think of FOD (Foreign Object Damage) OUTSIDE the aircraft, but this is an example of one INSIDE. This is the reason that the Apollo spacecraft components were vibrated upside down to rid the spacecraft of FOD. I can imagine that inhaling a rivet head in zero gee could ruin your whole day.
Robots that walk have come a long way from simple barebones walking machines or pairs of legs without an upper body and head. Much of the research these days focuses on making more humanoid robots. But they are not all created equal.
The IEEE Computer Society has named the top 10 trends for 2014. You can expect the convergence of cloud computing and mobile devices, advances in health care data and devices, as well as privacy issues in social media to make the headlines. And 3D printing came out of nowhere to make a big splash.
For industrial control applications, or even a simple assembly line, that machine can go almost 24/7 without a break. But what happens when the task is a little more complex? That’s where the “smart” machine would come in. The smart machine is one that has some simple (or complex in some cases) processing capability to be able to adapt to changing conditions. Such machines are suited for a host of applications, including automotive, aerospace, defense, medical, computers and electronics, telecommunications, consumer goods, and so on. This discussion will examine what’s possible with smart machines, and what tradeoffs need to be made to implement such a solution.